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SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES FOR THE BTWC SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE 
 
Graham S. Pearson* & Nicholas A. Sims†
 
1.  The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
will be held in Geneva during the period from 20 November to 8 December 2006.  Article 
XII of the Convention requires that: 
 
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by 
a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be 
held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to 
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, 
including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being 
realized.  Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. 
 
As there has not been a complete review of the operation of the Convention since 1996, it is 
especially important that all States Parties prepare now to ensure a successful outcome to the 
Sixth Review Conference.   As others have pointed out, success is rarely accidental and needs 
to be planned for. 
 
2.  This Review Conference Paper looks ahead to the Sixth Review Conference in the light of 
the developments relevant to the Convention around the world both nationally and 
internationally.  A number of successful outcomes are identified and it is recommended that 
the States Parties adopt a modular approach obtaining agreement where consensus is 
achievable. 
 
Background 
 
3.  The BTWC is the multilaterally agreed norm that totally prohibits biological and toxin 
weapons and provides the cornerstone against the risks that such weapons might be used by 
States Parties or by sub State actors.  It also enhances international peace and security against 
the risk that advances in the life sciences may provide novel ways of causing harm to 
humans, animals or plants. 
 
4.  There is no doubt about the risks posed by biological and toxin weapons.  Their 
capabilities were proven in national offensive programmes in the years prior to the entry into 
force of the BTWC in 1975.1   It is also evident that public awareness and concerns about 
outbreaks of disease in humans, animals and plants are greatly heightened – SARS, Avian Flu 
and Foot and Mouth Disease outbreaks have caused widespread public alarm.   In addition, 
the past decade has seen heightened concern about the possible use of biological or toxin 
agents by sub-State actors notably following the attempts to disperse anthrax and botulinum 
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toxin by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Tokyo in 1993/4 without casualties and the anthrax letters 
in the United States in September/October 2001 which resulted in five deaths. 
 
5.  There is widespread recognition of the value to international peace and security provided 
by the BTWC.   For example, recent statements by the G-8, EU, NAM, ASEAN, the Rio 
Group as well as major powers such as China and the Russian Federation have all reaffirmed 
the importance of the BTWC and the need to take steps to increase its effectiveness. 
 
6.   Consequently, as we approach the Sixth Review Conference there are widespread 
expectations both politically and publicly that the States Parties will demonstrate their 
accountability and commitment to the obligations that they have undertaken in becoming 
States Parties to the Convention.  There is also a widespread anticipation that the States 
Parties will act responsibly by adopting a constructive approach to achieving a successful 
outcome to the Sixth Review Conference and thereby demonstrating in concrete terms the 
real value to international peace and security made by the Convention. 
 
 
Preparing for the Review Conference 
 
7.  The first step is to hold the Preparatory Committee meeting on Wednesday to Friday 26 to 
28 April 2006 at which to agree on the provisional agenda for the Review Conference and 
also the provisional distribution among the various regional groups of the various positions 
such as the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting 
Committee and the Credentials Committee. 
 
8.  In Review Conference Paper No. 10 Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 
20062, it was noted that Review Conferences have been held at about five year intervals in 
1980, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001/2002. These have been chaired in rotation by 
representatives from the Group of Eastern European States, the Group of Non-Aligned and 
Other States and the Western Group as summarized in the table below. 
 
Review Conference Date Presidency 
First 3 to 21 March 1980 President Ambassador Oscar Vaernø (Norway) 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
Ambassador Petar Voutov (Bulgaria)  
Chairman of the Drafting Committee  
Ambassador C. G. Maina (Kenya)  
Chairman of the Credentials Committee 
Ambassador C. A. de Souza e Silva (Brazil) 
Second 8 to 26 September 
1986 
President, Ambassador Winfried Lang (Austria) 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, 
Ambassador M. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee 
Ambassador R. Butler (Australia)  
Chairman of the Credentials Committee, 
Ambassador D. D. Afande (Kenya) 
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Third 9 to 27 September 
1991 
President Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan 
(Argentina) 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
Ambassador H. Wagenmakers (the Netherlands) 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee  
Ambassador T. Tóth (Hungary) 
Chairman of the Credentials Committee 
Ambassador W. Lang (Austria)  
Fourth 25 November to 6 
December 1996 
President Ambassador Sir Michael Weston 
(United Kingdom)  
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
Ambassador Jorge Berguño (Chile)  
Chairman of the Drafting Committee  
Ambassador Tibor Tóth (Hungary)  
Chairman of the Credentials Committee 
Mrs Maria Francisca Arias Castaño (Colombia)  
Fifth 19 November to 7 
December 2001 
& 
11 to 22 November 
2002 
President Ambassador Tibor Tóth (Hungary) 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
Ambassador Markku Reimaa (Finland)  
Chairman of the Drafting Committee  
Ambassador Munir Akram (Pakistan)  
Chairman of the Credentials Committee 
Ambassador Ali-Ashgar Soltanieh (Islamic 
Republic of Iran) 
 
9.  Consequently, for the Sixth Review Conference, the President can be expected to be from 
the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
from the Group of Eastern European States, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee from 
the Western Group and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee from the Western Group. 
 
10. The Preparatory Committee also can be expected to give consideration to the following 
questions relating to the organization of the Review Conference: 
 
(a) Date and duration; 
(b) Provisional agenda; 
(c) Draft Rules of Procedure; 
(d) Background documentation; 
(e) Publicity; 
(f) Final document(s). 
 
11.  The date and duration are likely to have already been determined by consultation 
among the States Parties as it is known  that the Depositary Governments have identified a 
three week period for the holding of the Sixth Review Conference from 20 November to 8 
December 2006.  It is recommended strongly that the States Parties use the three weeks 
available in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the operation of all aspects of the 
Convention as this has not been done since the Third Review Conference in 1991. 
 
12.  The provisional agenda, because there was no Final Declaration following the Fifth 
Review Conference, is likely to be developed from that recommended for the Fifth Review 
Conference by its Preparatory Committee which was as follows: 
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ANNEX I 
 
DRAFT PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE 
 
1. Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee 
2. Election of the President 
3. Adoption of the agenda 
4. Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee 
5. Adoption of the Rules of Procedure 
6. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-
Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials 
Committee 
7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference 
(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee 
(b) Report of the Credentials Committee 
8. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General 
9. Programme of work 
10. Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII 
(a) General debate 
(b) Articles I-XV 
(c) Preambular paragraphs and purposes of the Convention 
11. Consideration of issues identified in the review of Article XII contained in the 
Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, and possible follow-up action 
12. Work done to strengthen the Convention in accordance with the decision of the 
1994 Special Conference 
13. Other matters, including the question of future review of the Convention 
14. Report of the Committee of the Whole 
15. Report of the Drafting Committee 
16. Preparation and adoption of the final document(s) 
 
13.  It is probable that agenda items 1 to 11 would be unchanged as would agenda items 13 to 
16.  Agenda item 11 would provide the link between the outcome of the Fourth Review 
Conference and its decision as to what should be considered inter alia by the next Review 
Conference.  Two questions that would need to be considered by the Preparatory Committee 
would be whether it was necessary or desirable to include in the provisional agenda for the 
Sixth Review Conference the decision of the Fifth Review Conference to hold annual 
meetings of the States Parties during the period between the Fifth and Sixth Review 
Conferences and secondly whether it was necessary or desirable to retain agenda item 12: 
 
12. Work done to strengthen the Convention in accordance with the decision of the 
1994 Special Conference 
 
14.  Insofar as the decision of the Fifth Review Conference is concerned, the key requirement 
is that the Sixth Review Conference should inter alia consider the outcome of the annual 
meetings and whether any further action is required.  However, consideration needs to be 
given as to whether the outcome of the annual meetings should be considered as part of the 
Review of the operation of the Convention under Agenda item 10 (b) or if there should be a 
separate item to consider the outcomes of the annual meetings.   On balance, there will be 
advantage in considering the outcomes of the annual meetings as part of the Article by 
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Article review of the operation of the Convention as this is likely to result in a more 
integrated outcome. 
 
15.  The question relating to agenda item 12 of the Fifth Review Conference is more 
contentious.   There is little doubt that the majority, if not all, of the States Parties would 
indeed support, in principle if not in specific terms, the requirement to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. It is, however, equally true 
that it was a failure to agree on language in regard to agenda item 12 in the Final Declaration 
of the Fifth Review Conference that led to the adjournment of that Review Conference. The 
mandate derived from the 1994 Special Conference is now one among several competing 
approaches to the strengthening of the Convention.  To emphasise its unique significance or 
authority could well no longer be productive. 
 
16.  Although an option would be to omit agenda item 12 from the provisional agenda for the 
Sixth Review Conference and to leave the question of the strengthening of the Convention to 
the consideration of Article V in the review of the operation of the Convention, this would 
serve simply to postpone the agenda issue to the Sixth Review Conference itself, and might 
hinder adequate preparation for addressing the substance of the question.   It also needs to be 
recalled that the report3 of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change was issued on 2 December 2004 and that this included two 
recommendations specifically relating to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: 
 
27.  States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without 
delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active 
participation of the biotechnology industry. 
 
34. States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate 
a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish 
binding international standards for the export of such agents. 
 
17. The first opportunity for the States Parties to the BTWC to consider these 
recommendations will be at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006.  Whilst the Secretary-
General’s report4 In larger freedom took some aspects of these recommendations forward, 
the failure of the Summit to agree language on disarmament and non-proliferation means that 
the impact of the High Level Panel recommendations will, by late 2006, have become 
somewhat diluted and muted by the passage of the two years since its report appeared.   There 
is also the prospect that the Swedish Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by 
Hans Blix will produce its report in 2006 and that it will include recommendations relating to 
the BTWC.   From the statements made at the First Committee of the General Assembly in 
late 2005, it is evident that there is still considerable political attention being given to what 
should be done to strengthen the BTWC.  It would therefore be prudent for the Sixth Review 
Conference to address the substance of the issue in Agenda item 12 as States Parties would 
then prepare for this discussion. It is recommended that an appropriate item should be 
included in the provisional agenda.  Whilst this could have been along the lines of: 
 
                                                 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
4 United Nations General Assembly, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, 
Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. 
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12. Work done to strengthen the Convention in accordance with the decision of the 
1994 Special Conference 
 
this might with advantage be made more open-ended and forward looking and thus, more 
widely acceptable, by updating the item to read: 
 
12. Work to strengthen the Convention 
 
18.  This could therefore consider all developments since the Third Review Conference in 
1991 and its decision to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the 
Convention – an aim which must surely still command consensus amongst all States Parties.  
Work on such an item 12 could adopt a modular approach which could include consideration 
inter alia of such ideas as the holding of further annual Meetings of States Parties prepared 
by Meetings of Experts as well as the holding of an ‘ad hoc’ meeting of States Parties in 2007 
to consider future action to strengthen the Convention, as recommended in Review 
Conference Paper No. 145.       
  
19.  The draft rules of procedure are likely to be the same as in 2001. The Preparatory 
Committee can be expected to recommend as the draft Rules of Procedure of the Sixth 
Review Conference the Rules of Procedure of the Fifth Review Conference, as contained in 
document BWC/CONF.V/17. 
 
20.  The background documentation required is likely to be the same as requested in 2001 
although the opportunity should be taken in addition to specifically invite the States Parties 
to provide information to the Secretariat regarding actions taken by the States Parties 
following the annual meetings of the States Parties held in accordance with the decision of 
the Fifth Review Conference.  The requirement for background documentation would thus be 
for four documents to be compiled by the Secretariat this time: 
 
1.  Background information document providing, in summary tabular form, data on 
the participation of States Parties in the agreed Confidence-Building Measures since 
the last Review Conference.  
 
2.  Background information document on compliance by States Parties with all their 
obligations under the Convention, compiled from information provided by them.  
 
3.  Background information on new scientific and technological developments 
relevant to the Convention and covering the applications being made of such 
developments and their relevance to various aspects of the Convention, compiled 
from information provided by the States Parties.  
 
4.  Background information document on actions taken by States Parties following the 
annual meetings of the States Parties held in accordance with the decision of the Fifth 
Review Conference, compiled from information provided by them. 
 
21.  An alternative to requesting an additional background paper on the actions taken by 
                                                 
5 Graham S. Pearson, The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel: Biological Weapons Issues, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 14, May 2005.  Available at 
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States Parties following the annual meetings would be to amend the request for the 
background paper on compliance by States Parties so that this specifically also includes any 
actions taken by States Parties following the annual meetings of the States Parties.  In such a 
case the language in item 2, in the previous paragraph could be amended to read: 
 
2.  Background information document on compliance by States Parties with all their 
obligations under the Convention including action taken by States Parties following 
the annual meetings of the States Parties, compiled from information provided by 
them.  
 
22.  In addition to these four documents of a general character, more specifically focused 
papers on the possible modalities for measures such as those identified later in this Review 
Conference Paper and estimated costs of institutional support for particular purposes within 
the overall operation and implementation of the Convention could usefully be requested by 
the Preparatory Committee or its bureau so that the Review Conference is more adequately 
prepared.  The Preparatory Committee should agree that such additional specifically focused 
papers be prepared by the Secretariat under the guidance of the bureau. 
 
23.  In regard to publicity for the Review Conference, it would be expected that, as at the 
Fifth Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee would decide to request the Secretariat 
to issue press releases for the meetings of the Review Conference. 
 
24.  Finally, in regard to final document(s) of the Review Conference, it would be expected 
that, as at the Fifth Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee would decide to include 
an appropriate item in the provisional agenda of the Conference. Although this would not, in 
itself, commit the Conference to a Final Declaration, it is our view that a Final Declaration, 
derived from a comprehensive review, is vital for a successful outcome to the Sixth Review 
Conference, and that its centrality to maximising the benefits of the review process must be 
reaffirmed for the process to recover. 
 
Successful Outcomes 
 
25.   In looking ahead to the Sixth Review Conference, all States Parties need to reaffirm the 
value of a strong Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and to recognise that 
the regime has been strengthened effectively by the extended understandings agreed by the 
States Parties in their Final Declarations at successive Review Conferences.  There is a great 
deal that the States Parties can achieve at the Sixth Review Conference in 
November/December 2006.  It will be important to concentrate on substance, to be 
reasonably ambitious and by adopting a modular approach obtain agreement where there is 
consensus.  
 
 
26.  In this Review Conference Paper a number of successful outcomes are examined which 
could be adopted in a modular approach.   The focus in this Review Conference Paper is on 
the possible outcomes that appear to have been most thoroughly considered and hence to be 
likely to be successfully achieved.  Each single successful outcome is self-contained and 
independent of any other outcome. 
 
Universality 
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27.  At successive Review Conferences the States Parties have called upon States which have 
not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay.  Thus at the Fourth 
Review Conference the Final Declaration6 under Article XIV: 
 
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that a number of States have acceded 
to the Convention since the Third Review Conference. 
 
2. The Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the 
Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the 
Convention to join the States Parties thereto, thus contributing to the achievement of 
universal adherence to the Convention. 
 
3. In this connection, the Conference requests States Parties to encourage wider 
adherence to the Convention. 
 
4. The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to 
wider accession to the Convention. 
 
In addition, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on 8 December 
2005 as A/RES/60/96 included as its first operative paragraph: 
 
1.  Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, reaffirms 
the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so 
without delay, and calls upon those States that have not yet signed the Convention to 
become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of 
universal adherence to the Convention. 
 
28.  There is therefore a widespread and continuing recognition by all States Parties of the 
importance of achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.  However, the rate at 
which States have become Parties to the Convention has been very slow during recent years: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 October 
2001 
October 
2002 
November 
2003 
December  
2004 
June 2005 
Number of States 
Parties 
144 146 151 153 155 
Number of 
Signatory States 
18 17 16 16 16 
 
                                                 
6 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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29.  This slow rate of approaching universality is all the more pronounced when a comparison 
is made with the Chemical Weapons Convention which entered into force on 29 April 1997.  
At its First Review Conference7 in April/May 2003, the States Parties in regard to 
universality of the CWC agreed that: 
 
The First Review Conference recommended that the Council, with the cooperation of 
the Secretariat, develop and implement a plan of action to further encourage, in a 
systematic and coordinated manner, adherence to the Convention and to assist States 
ready to join the Convention in their national preparations to implement it [Emphasis 
added] (RC-1/5, para.7.18). 
 
The background paper8 provided by the OPCW on adherence to the CWC for the First 
Review Conference provided a summary of the participation in the Convention: 
 
Date Number of 
States Parties 
Number of 
States Parties for 
which Entry into 
Force was 
pending 
Signatory States 
not Party 
Non-Signatory 
States not Party 
29 April 1997 87 0 78 28 
29 April 1998 107 1 60 25 
29 April 1999 121 0 48 24 
29 April 2000 132 3 37 21 
29 April 2001 143 0 31 19 
29 April 2002 143 0 31 19 
 
30.    Since adoption of the Action Plan on Universality following the CWC Review 
Conference, the number of States Parties has increased9 significantly: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 May 2003 October 
2003 
June 
2004 
February  
2005 
March 
2006 
Number of States 
Parties 
151 154 164 167 178 
Number of States 
Parties for which 
Entry into Force 
2 3 0 0 0 
                                                 
7 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Report of the First Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review 
Conference) 28 April – 9 May 2003, RC-1/5, 9 May 2003.  Available at http://www.opcw.org. 
8 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Background Paper on Universal Adherence 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-1/S/5, 25 April 2003.  Available at http://www.opcw.org. 
9 Scott Spence, Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC Experience, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 13, April 2005.  Available 
at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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was pending 
Signatory States 
not Party 
25 22 18 16 8 
Non-Signatory 
States not Party 
16 15 12 11 8 
 
31.  It is thus evident that in March 2006, the States Parties to the CWC are some 178, over 
twenty more than the number of States Parties to the BTWC.  There is consequently a 
window of opportunity at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference in November/December 
2006 for the States Parties to the BTWC to mount an initiative to encourage all those States 
who have acceded to the CWC to also accede to the BTWC.   Rather than just adopting an 
exhortation, as at previous Review Conferences, it would be timely to agree to actually do 
something to achieve the objective of universality.   Whilst this might be called an Action 
Plan there might be advantage in adopting some different terminology such as an 
achievement timeline with the objective of reaching 180 States Parties to the BTWC no later 
than the Seventh Review Conference in 2011.   The States Parties at the Sixth Review 
Conference in agreeing this achievement timeline need to also agree on how the initiative is 
to be progressed and how the progress towards this objective will be reported regularly to the 
States Parties.   Such a progress report would be appropriate at future annual Meetings of the 
States Parties at which agreement could be reached on additional action should that be 
necessary. 
 
National Implementation 
 
32.  At successive Review Conferences the States Parties have reaffirmed the importance of 
Article IV of the Convention.  Thus at the Fourth Review Conference the Final Declaration10 
under Article IV stated: 
 
1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV.  It reaffirms the 
commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this 
Article, in accordance with their constitutional processes.  These measures are to 
ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere within their territory, under 
their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes 
contrary to the Convention.  The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through 
the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their 
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and 
toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity. 
 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of States 
Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its 
call to any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so 
immediately, in accordance with its constitutional processes.  Such measures should 
apply within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.  The 
                                                 
10 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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Conference invites each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in 
conformity with international law, the application of such measures also to actions 
taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
33.  In addition, national implementation was one of the issues considered during the 2003 to 
2005 intersessional process11 when the topic in 2003 was: 
 
i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions 
set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
The outcome of the Meeting of States Parties in 2003 was to agree a short report12 on both of 
the topics saying: 
 
At the Meeting of States Parties, States Parties noted that notwithstanding the 
differing legal and constitutional arrangements among the 151 States Parties to the 
Convention, States have adopted similar basic approaches and share common 
principles. The States Parties stressed the need for undertaking activities at the 
national level in keeping with their obligations and responsibilities to strengthen and 
implement the Convention. The States Parties agreed, to that end, on the value of the 
following: 
 
To review, and where necessary, enact or update national legal, including 
regulatory and penal, measures which ensure effective implementation of the 
prohibition of the Convention, and which enhance effective security of 
pathogens and toxins. 
 
The positive effect of cooperation between States Parties with differing legal 
and constitutional arrangements. States Parties in a position to do so may 
wish to provide legal and technical assistance to others who request it in 
framing and/or expanding their own legislation and controls in the areas of 
national implementation and biosecurity. 
 
The need for comprehensive and concrete national measures to secure 
pathogen collections and the control of their use for peaceful purposes. There 
was a general recognition of the value of biosecurity measures and 
procedures, which will ensure that such dangerous materials are not 
accessible to persons who might or could misuse them for purposes contrary 
to the Convention. 
 
States Parties considered that agreement on the value of these measures discussed at 
the Meeting constitutes an essential effort to facilitate more effective implementation 
                                                 
11 United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001 and 11 – 22 November 2002. Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
12 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their Destruction, First 
Meeting, Geneva, 10 – 14 November 2003. Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2003/4 (Vol. 1), 
24 November 2003. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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and enforcement of the Convention, as well as providing a basis for review of 
progress at the 2006 Review Conference. 
 
34.  In addition, national implementation measures have been the subject of an Action Plan 
undertaken by the States Parties to the CWC following their First Review Conference in 
2003.  At that Review Conference the States Parties agreed13: 
 
The First Review Conference called upon States Parties that have not already done 
so to inform the OPCW by the next regular session of the Conference of the status of 
their adoption of the legislative and administrative measures necessary for or taken 
by them to implement the Convention, of any problems they have encountered, and of 
any assistance they require.   Having considered the importance of national 
implementation measures for the proper functioning of the Convention, and having 
reviewed the activities undertaken by the States Parties as well as the Secretariat, the 
First Review Conference… 
 
(h) agreed to develop, at its next regular session, a plan of action based on a 
recommendation from the Council regarding the implementation of Article VII 
obligations, with the objective of fostering the full and effective 
implementation of the Convention by all States Parties. [Emphasis added] 
(RC-1/5, para.7.83). 
 
35.  Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1314 described the action being taken by the 
OPCW and a further update was published15 in the CBW Conventions Bulletin of  
September/December 2005.   The situation can be summarised as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Status at Number of 
States Parties 
Number (and percentage) of 
States Parties that have 
submitted national 
implementation 
Legislation covers 
area key to the 
enforcement of the 
CWC 
May 1997 87 0 (0%) Not available 
December 1997 103 24 (23%) Not available 
November 1998 120 40 (33%) Not available 
July 1999 125 43 (34%) Not available 
                                                 
13 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Report of the First Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review 
Conference) 28 April – 9 May 2003, RC-1/5, 9 May 2003.  Available at http://www.opcw.org. 
14 Scott Spence, Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC 
Experience, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 13, April 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
15 Santiago Oñate, Ralf Trapp and Lisa Tabassi, Decision on the Follow-up to the OPCW Action Plan on Article 
VII: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, CBW Conventions Bulletin, 
Issue No 69 + 70, September/December 2005, pp. 5-10. 
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May 2000 133 48 (36%) Not available 
May 2001 143 53 (38%) Not available 
October 2002 145 70 (48%) 39 (27%) 
October 2003 154 94 (61%) 51 (33%) 
November 2004 166 96 (58%) 52 (31%) 
November 2005 174 106 (61%) 59 (34%) 
 
This shows that even after the Action Plan, although almost two thirds of the States Parties to 
the CWC had submitted information on their national implementation to the OPCW, only 
about one third of the States Parties had succeeded in adopting legislation that covered the 
areas  key to the enforcement of the CWC. 
 
36.  The situation in regard to the adoption of national measures to implement the BTWC, as 
required by Article IV of the Convention which requires: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
 
is much less certain than that for the CWC.   There is, however, no basis on which to 
conclude that the situation is any better and it is likely to be worse. 
 
37.  There is widespread recognition of the importance of all States Parties adopting national 
legislation to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or 
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article 
I of the Convention.   The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)16 has also 
provided additional impetus for all States – and not solely the States Parties to the BTWC – 
to adopt national legislation.  Operative paragraph 2 requires: 
 
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall 
adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to 
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical 
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist 
purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate 
in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them; [Emphasis added] 
 
It would therefore be timely – and bring significant benefits to all States Parties – for the 
States Parties to the BTWC at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference in 
November/December 2006 to do more than simply adopt an exhortation along the lines of 
those agreed previously at Review Conferences.  There is a need for action to adopt national 
legislation to counter the continuing threat posed by biological and toxin weapons whether by 
States or by sub-State actors.   It is, however, appreciated that the action plan adopted by the 
OPCW has required significant resources from the Technical Secretariat and comparable 
resources are currently not available for the States Parties to the BTWC. 
 
                                                 
16 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th 
meeting, on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004. 
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38.  As recognised by SCR 1540 (2004) in its seventh operative paragraph, States may 
require assistance to implement this resolution: 
 
7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions 
of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to 
offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking 
the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources 
for fulfilling the above provisions; 
 
Consequently, at the Sixth Review Conference particular attention should be given to seeking 
a commitment from those States Parties in a position to do so to provide assistance to States 
Parties requiring such assistance in developing and adopting national implementation 
legislation.   
 
39.  Although there may be some consideration to whether to adopt an action plan, it would 
be wise to adopt different terminology as the resources provided by the OPCW to support the 
CWC Article VII national implementation action plan will not be available.  It is suggested 
that an achievement timeline which sets a target for two thirds of the States Parties to the 
BTWC to have adopted national implementation legislation by the time of the Seventh 
Review Conference would be an effective and desirable outcome.   It would be greatly aided 
by one or more States Parties undertaking to provide resources to facilitate the adoption of 
legislation by States Parties as well as to monitor and report to the States Parties annually on 
progress towards this target.   Such a progress report would be appropriate at future annual 
Meetings of the States Parties at which agreement could be reached on additional action 
should that be necessary. 
 
Article V Consultation and Cooperation Procedures 
 
40.  At the Third Review Conference the States Parties agreed17 procedures to strengthen the 
implementation of Article V: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation 
assumed by States parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any 
problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the 
provisions of, the Convention. 
 
The Conference reaffirms the agreement reached at the Second Review Conference, 
and agrees that in order to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article 
V the following provisions should be adopted: 
 
- A formal consultative meeting could be preceded by bilateral or other 
consultations by agreement among those States parties involved in the 
problems which had arisen; 
 
- Requests for the convening of a consultative meeting shall be addressed to 
the Depositaries, who shall immediately inform all States parties of the 
                                                 
17 United Nations, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9 – 27 September 1991. Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23, 1991. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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request and shall convene within 30 days an informal meeting of the interested 
States parties to discuss the arrangements for the formal consultative meeting, 
which shall be convened within 60 days of receipt of the request; 
 
- With regard to the taking of decisions, the consultative meeting shall proceed 
in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Review 
Conference; 
 
- The costs of the consultative meeting shall be met by the States parties 
participating in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale 
prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations 
membership and the number of States parties participating in the meeting; 
 
- A consultative meeting may consider any problems which may arise in 
relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention, suggest ways and means for further clarifying, inter alia, with 
assistance of technical experts, any matter considered ambiguous or 
unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate international procedures within the 
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter; 
 
- The consultative meeting, or any State party, may request specialized 
assistance in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective 
of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, through, inter 
alia, appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United 
Nations and in accordance with its Charter; 
 
- The States parties agree that, should the consultative meeting, or any State 
party, make use of such procedures within the framework of the United 
Nations, including lodging a complaint with the Security Council under 
Article VI of the Convention, the Secretary-General may be kept informed; 
 
- The Conference considers that States parties shall cooperate with the 
consultative meeting in its consideration of any problems which may arise in 
relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention, and in clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters, as well as 
cooperate in appropriate international procedures within the framework of the 
United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. 
 
41.  At the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 the States Parties in their Final Declaration18 
under Article V noted the following in regard to these procedures: 
 
2. The Conference also reviewed the operation of the procedures to strengthen 
the implementation of the provisions of Article V which were adopted in the Final 
Declaration of the Third Review Conference and which built on the agreements 
reached at the Second Review Conference.  While noting that these procedures have 
not yet been invoked, the Conference reaffirmed their present validity.  The 
                                                 
18 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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Conference calls on any State Party which identifies a problem arising in relation to 
the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention to use these 
procedures, if appropriate, to address and resolve it. 
 
42.  These procedures were used in 1997 when an allegation was made by Cuba19. It will 
therefore be appropriate to  review the procedures at the Sixth Review Conference in the light 
of the experience gained in the 1997 implementation of them and the developments in the 
international scene since then.  A successful outcome at the Sixth Review Conference is thus 
a review and reaffirmation or amendment of the procedures for consultation and cooperation 
under Article V of the Convention. 
 
Confidence-Building Measures 
 
43.  The States Parties agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 to submit 
information annually under Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).  The CBMs were 
reviewed and extended at the Third Review Conference in 199120: 
 
In accordance with the decision of the Second Review Conference, and taking into 
account views expressed concerning the need to strengthen the implementation of the 
provisions of Article V, the Conference reviewed the effectiveness of the provisions in 
Article V for consultation and cooperation and of the cooperative measures agreed in 
the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference, and considered whether or 
not further actions were called for to create further cooperative measures. The 
Conference came to the following conclusions and recommendations: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of the confidence-building measures agreed 
upon at the Second Review Conference, as well as the modalities elaborated by the Ad 
Hoc Meeting of the Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the 
Convention held in 1987. The Conference recognizes the exchange of information that 
took place on this agreed basis between 1987 and 1991. The Conference urges all 
States parties to submit information to future rounds of information exchange. 
 
With a view to promoting increased participation and strengthening further the 
exchange of information, the Conference agrees to reaffirm those measures 
established at the Second Review Conference with the following improvements: to add 
a declaration on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"; to amend and 
extend the exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; to amend the 
exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences 
caused by toxins; to amend the measure for the active promotion of contacts; and to 
add three new confidence-building measures entitled "Declaration of legislation, 
regulations and other measures"; "Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or 
                                                 
19 For an account of the way in which the Article V procedures were used to deal with the Cuban allegation see 
Graham S. Pearson, Article V:  Consultation and Cooperation, in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & 
Nicholas A. Sims, Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies, November 2001.  Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
20 United Nations, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9 – 27 September 1991. Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23, 1991. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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defensive biological research development programmes"; and "Declaration of 
vaccine production facilities". 
 
Accordingly, the Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and 
determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence 
in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States parties are to 
implement, on the basis of mutual cooperation, the following measures set out in the 
annex to this Final Declaration, in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of 
ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international cooperation 
in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities: 
 
1. Declaration form on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare" 
 
2. Confidence-building measure "A": 
 
- Part1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; 
 
- Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence 
research and development programmes. 
 
3. Confidence-building measure "B": 
 
- Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and 
similar occurrences caused by toxins. 
 
4. Confidence-building measure "C": 
 
- Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of 
knowledge. 
 
5. Confidence-building measure "D": 
 
- Active promotion of contacts. 
 
6. Confidence-building measure "E": 
 
- Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures. 
 
7. Confidence-building measure "F": 
 
- Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes. 
 
8. Confidence-building measure "G": 
 
- Declaration of vaccine production facilities. 
 
The Conference also agrees that the exchange of information and data, using the 
revised forms, be sent to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs no 
later than 15 April on an annual basis and should cover the previous calendar year. 
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44.  At the Fourth Review Conference21, the States Parties did not carry out a detailed review 
of the CBMs as they were aware that the Ad Hoc Group was then engaged in considering the 
incorporation of existing and further enhanced CBMs into a regime to strengthen the 
Convention: 
 
5. The Conference notes the background information document prepared by the 
United Nations Secretary-General providing data on the participation of States 
Parties in the agreed confidence-building measures since the Third Review 
Conference.  The Conference welcomes the exchange of information carried out 
under the confidence-building measures, and notes that this has contributed to 
enhancing transparency and building confidence.  The Conference recognizes that 
participation in the confidence-building measures since the last Review Conference 
has not been universal, and that not all responses have been prompt or complete.  In 
this regard, the Conference also recognizes the technical difficulties experienced by 
some States Parties with respect to preparing CBM responses.  In this regard, the 
Conference urges all States Parties to complete full and timely declarations in the 
future.  The Conference notes that the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties established by 
the Special Conference in 1994 is, as part of its continuing work, considering the 
incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency 
measures, as appropriate, in a regime to strengthen the Convention. 
 
45.  At the Fifth Review Conference, a number of useful proposals to strengthen the CBMs 
were submitted by South Africa22.   These are well worth further consideration, along with 
other ideas for improving the responses from the States Parties in their annual submissions of 
CBM returns, at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference in November/December 2006.  
Consideration needs to be given to a review of the existing CBMs and their format; proposals 
for new CBMs; provision for electronic submission and circulation; collation, translation and 
elaboration procedures; and the provision of assistance, where requested.  It needs, however, 
to be considered whether there will be sufficient time at the Sixth Review Conference to 
consider the details of the existing CBMs and how they might be improved.  It should be 
recalled that at the Second Review Conference in 1986 the States Parties agreed to hold an ad 
hoc meeting in 1987 of scientific and technical experts from States Parties to finalise the 
modalities for the exchange of information and data by working out, inter alia, appropriate 
forms to be used by States Parties for the exchange of information agreed to in this Final 
Declaration, thus enabling States Parties to follow a standardised procedure.  
 
46.  There would be merit in the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference agreeing that a 
Meeting of States Parties should be held in 2007 to consider and decide how to improve the 
effectiveness of the CBM process with this Meeting being prepared for by an earlier two 
week Meeting of Experts. The Meeting of Experts on CBMs to prepare for the annual 
                                                 
21 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
22 South Africa, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001. Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures Working 
Paper by South Africa, BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1, 16 November 2001. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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Meeting would provide an opportunity for States Parties to share best practice in compiling 
annual CBM returns and identifying how the effectiveness of the CBM process might best be 
improved.  It is evident from the experience gained during the period from 2003 to 2005 that 
the process of annual one week Meetings of States Parties prepared by an earlier two week 
Meeting of Experts has worked well and been effective in achieving a good exchange of 
information. 
 
Strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention 
 
47.   As already noted earlier in this Review Conference Paper in the paragraphs addressing 
the Preparatory Committee consideration of the Agenda for the Review Conference (see 
paragraphs 13 to 18), a particular issue that will need to be considered relates to what should 
be done at the Sixth Review Conference about agenda item 12 of the Fifth Review 
Conference Agenda: 
 
12. Work done to strengthen the Convention in accordance with the decision of the 
1994 Special Conference 
 
This is a contentious issue but is not one that can be ignored.   There is little doubt that the 
majority, if not all, of the States Parties would indeed support, in principle if not in specific 
terms, the requirement to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the 
Convention. It is, however, equally true that it was a failure to agree on language in regard to 
agenda item 12 in the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference that led to the 
adjournment of that Review Conference. The mandate derived from the 1994 Special 
Conference is now one among several competing approaches to the strengthening of the 
Convention.  To emphasise its unique significance or authority could well no longer be 
productive. 
 
48.  Work on how to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the 
Convention could be taken forward as a part of the modular approach by the States Parties at 
the Sixth Review Conference agreeing to hold an ‘ad hoc’ meeting of experts from States 
Parties in 2007 to consider future action to strengthen the Convention, as recommended in 
Review Conference Paper No. 1423. 
 
49.  As noted in Review Conference Paper No. 14, there is no value in continuing 
recriminations about why the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group came to an end in July 2001.  
Rather, a fresh start needs to be made. This could therefore be to consider all developments 
since the Third Review Conference in 1991 and its decision to strengthen the effectiveness 
and improve the implementation of the Convention – an aim which must surely still 
command consensus amongst all States Parties.    It is hard to imagine that any State Party 
would object to such an objective and it is argued that all States Parties would indeed agree to 
this. 
 
50.  Having agreed this objective, the next step is to consider how best the States Parties can 
achieve this objective starting from the Sixth Review Conference in 2006.   By recognizing 
the common agreement to the objective, the onus is put onto all States Parties to address how 
                                                 
23 Graham S. Pearson, The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel: Biological Weapons Issues, University 
of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 14, May 2005.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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best to move forward to achieve this.   It also needs to be recognized that the Sixth Review 
Conference is not the occasion on which to address the details of how best to achieve this 
objective as there is a great deal of substantive business that needs to be accomplished during 
the three weeks of the Review Conference.   The Final Declaration of the Sixth Review 
Conference should include in its Article V section language along the lines of: 
 
The Conference reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the effectiveness and 
improving the implementation of the Convention and agreed that that experts from the 
States Parties would meet in 2007 to consider and recommend to a subsequent 
Meeting of States Parties how best to achieve this objective. 
 
It would be up to the Meeting of Experts in 2007 to recommend to a subsequent Meeting of 
States Parties how best to achieve the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and 
improving the implementation of the Convention. Language as suggested above would be 
effective in moving the process forward.  
 
51.   The meeting proposed in 2007 would have no preconditions but simply require the 
experts from the States Parties to consider collectively how best to achieve the objective of 
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the implementation of the Convention taking 
into account all the international developments over the past fifteen years.   
 
Article VI Investigations 
 
52.    The States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference agreed in their Final Declaration24 
under Article VI that: 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VI, which, in addition to 
the procedures contained in Article V, provides that any State Party which finds that 
any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention may 
lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council.  The Conference notes 
that the provisions of Article VI will be taken into account, as appropriate, for any 
future verification regime resulting from the consideration by the Ad Hoc Group of a 
system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention.  The Conference 
emphasizes the provision of Article VI that such a complaint should include all 
possible evidence confirming its validity.  It stresses that, as in the case of the 
implementation of all the provisions and procedures set forth in the Convention, the 
procedures foreseen in Article VI should be implemented in good faith within the 
scope of the Convention. 
 
53.  In addition, the Final Declaration also included: 
 
4. The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security Council 
resolution 620 (1988), which at the time encouraged the United Nations Secretary-
General to carry out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to its 
attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that could entail a violation of the 1925 
                                                 
24 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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Geneva Protocol or of any other applicable rule of international treaty or customary 
law.  The Conference also recalls the technical guidelines and procedures contained 
in Annex I of United Nations document A/44/561 to guide the United Nations 
Secretary-General on the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible 
use of such weapons.  The States Parties reaffirm their agreement to consult, at the 
request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the 
United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations.  The 
Conference stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nations is called upon 
to take appropriate measures expeditiously, which could include a request to the 
Security Council to consider action in accordance with the Charter. 
 
54.   In addition, the States Parties at their annual meetings in 2004 considered the topic: 
 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons 
or suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
and in their Report25 they agreed: 
 
20. On the mandate to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective 
action on enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease, the States Parties recognised that: 
 
a) capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of 
cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of 
disease promote the object and purpose of the Convention; 
 
b) States Parties’ national preparedness and arrangements substantially 
contribute to international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
c) the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and 
endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution A/Res/45/57, represents an 
international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of 
biological or toxin weapons. 
 
21. The States Parties consequently agreed on the value of: 
 
a) continuing to develop their own national capacities for response, 
investigation and mitigation, in cooperation with the relevant international 
and regional organisations, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and 
encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States Parties to do the 
same; 
                                                 
25 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Second Meeting, Geneva, 6 – 10 December 2004. Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2004/3, 
14 December 2004. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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b) the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, the further 
development of current procedures for the provision of assistance, by those in 
a position to do so, to States Parties in cases of alleged use of biological 
weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. 
 
55.  As reported26 at the time, the draft outcome paper for the December 2004 Meeting of 
States Parties had initially contained the following: 
 
(b) that consideration should be given to reviewing the Secretary-General’s 
mechanism for investigation of cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons 
and to invite the Secretary-General to report to the Sixth Review Conference on any 
actions that may be taken in this regard on the basis of consideration by the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
 
However, consensus could not be found on this language or on a development thereof.  
Consequently, all consideration has to be deferred to the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
56.  At the Sixth Review Conference, it is recommended that consideration be given to two 
aspects relating to Article VI Investigations.  The first is that the States Parties should 
consider developing the modalities of the procedure implicit in the first paragraph of Article 
VI of the Convention which states that: 
 
(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is acting 
in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a 
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should 
include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its 
consideration by the Security Council.  
 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any 
investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received 
by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention 
of the results of the investigation.  
 
The modalities of the procedure implicit in the first paragraph might be elaborated along the 
following lines: 
 
1.  The State Party lodging a complaint should identify which obligation under the 
Convention it considers has been breached and in what manner the breach has 
occurred. 
 
2.  The State Party lodging the complaint should compile a report containing all 
possible evidence relating to the alleged breach of obligations and the evidence 
therein should be validated to the extent possible. 
 
                                                 
26 Graham S. Pearson, The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, in The CBW Conventions 
Bulletin, Issue no 66, December 2004, pp. 21-34.  Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp 
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3.  The State Party lodging a compliant should implement the procedure as soon as 
possible after the alleged breach of the obligations under the Convention has taken 
place. 
 
57.  Secondly, the States Parties should recognise that it is in the interests of all States Parties 
to the BTWC to ensure that any investigation that may be carried out is both effective and 
credible.  Consequently, the States Parties should consider what steps are needed to ensure 
that the Secretary-General’s mechanism for the investigation of cases of alleged use of 
biological and toxin weapons would indeed be effective and credible.  There has been 
significant developments since the Secretary-General’s mechanism was first set up – for 
example, the OPCW has set up its mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical 
weapons and UNMOVIC has developed its procedures for investigations.  In both cases, the 
importance of trained experts and of accredited laboratories that have validated procedures 
for the analysis of samples have been recognised.  The Secretary-General’s mechanism has 
neither and is therefore seriously lagging in regard to the current internationally expected 
standard.  
 
Assistance 
 
58.  Article VII of the Convention states: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so 
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger 
as a result of violation of the Convention. 
 
59.  At the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties agreed in their Final Declaration27  
under Article VII that: 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking made by each State Party 
to provide or support assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that 
such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention. 
 
3. The Conference takes note of desires expressed that, should a request for 
assistance be made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided.  
In this context, pending consideration of a decision by the Security Council, timely 
emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties if requested. 
 
60.  It is considered that the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference should include as a 
topic for a future annual Meeting of States Parties prepared for by a Meeting of Experts the 
topic: 
 
To develop a procedure for the provision of timely emergency assistance to States 
Parties on request. 
 
                                                 
27 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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Such an annual Meeting should clearly involve participation by the WHO, FAO and OIE. 
 
61.  It should, however, be recognised that the provision of timely assistance to States Parties 
is wider than solely being concerned with emergency assistance.  For example, it is widely 
recognised that States Parties may require assistance with national implementation and with 
the preparation of annual CBM returns as well as in areas such as surveillance, detection, 
diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants.   There 
would therefore be advantage in slightly broadening the scope of the topic for a future annual 
Meeting of States Parties prepared for by a Meeting of Experts to: 
 
To develop a procedure for the provision of timely assistance to States Parties on 
request. 
 
International Cooperation 
 
62.  At the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties in the Article X section of the Final 
Declaration28 agreed seventeen paragraphs relating to international cooperation.  In particular, 
consideration was given to how existing institutional ways and means of promoting 
multilateral cooperation might be developed further: 
 
5. The Conference notes that existing institutional ways and means of ensuring 
multilateral cooperation between the developed and developing countries would need 
to be developed further in order to promote international cooperation in peaceful 
activities in such areas as medicine, public health and agriculture. 
 
6. The Conference reiterates its call upon the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body, 
before the next Review Conference, a discussion and examination of the means of 
improving institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the 
use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. 
 
7. The Conference recommends that invitations to participate in this discussion 
and examination should be extended to all States Parties, whether or not they are 
members of the United Nations or concerned specialized agencies. 
 
63.  In addition, the Final Declaration in its section on Article X addressed the response to 
infectious diseases: 
 
10. The Conference shares the worldwide concern about new, emerging and 
re-emerging infectious diseases and considers that the international response to them 
offers opportunities for increased cooperation in the context of Article X application 
and of strengthening the Convention.  The Conference welcomes the efforts to 
establish a system of global monitoring of disease and encourages States Parties to 
support the World Health Organization, including its relevant newly established 
division, the FAO and the OIE, in these efforts directed at assisting Member States to 
                                                 
28 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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strengthen national and local programmes of surveillance for infectious diseases and 
improve early notification, surveillance, control and response capabilities.  
 
and also went on to list a number of possible measures: 
 
12. The Conference urges States Parties, the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies to take further specific measures within their competence for the promotion 
of the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins 
for peaceful purposes and of international cooperation in this field.  Such measures 
could include, inter alia:  
 
1. Transfer and exchange of information concerning research 
programmes in biosciences and greater cooperation in international 
public health and disease control; 
 
2. Wider transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment 
among States on a systematic and long-term basis; 
 
3. Active promotion of contacts between scientists and technical 
personnel on a reciprocal basis, in relevant fields; 
 
4. Increased technical cooperation and assistance, including training 
programmes to developing countries in the use of biosciences and 
genetic engineering for peaceful purposes through active association 
with United Nations institutions, including the International Centre for 
Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB); 
 
5. Facilitating the conclusion of bilateral, regional and multiregional 
agreements providing, on a mutually advantageous, equal and 
non-discriminatory basis, for their participation in the development 
and application of biotechnology; 
 
6. Encouraging the coordination of national and regional programmes 
and working out in an appropriate manner the ways and means of 
cooperation in this field; 
7. Cooperation in providing information on their national 
epidemiological surveillance and data reporting systems, and in 
providing assistance, on a bilateral level and/or in conjunction with 
WHO, FAO and OIE regarding epidemiological and epizootical 
surveillance, with a view to improvements in the identification and 
timely reporting of significant outbreaks of human and animal 
diseases; 
 
8. The promotion of programmes for the exchange and training of 
scientists and experts, and the exchange of scientific and technical 
information in the biological field between developed and developing 
countries.   
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64.  The Final Declaration also called for the Secretary-General to collate annually reports on 
how Article X is being implemented: 
 
14. The Conference requests the Secretary-General to collate on an annual basis, 
and for the information of States Parties, reports on how this article [X] is being 
implemented. 
 
15. The Conference welcomes the information provided by a number of States 
Parties on the cooperative measures they have undertaken towards fulfilling their 
Article X obligations and encourages States Parties in a position to do so to provide 
such information. 
 
65.  Thus far, there has been no such annual report by the Secretary-General and the 
information provided by a number of States Parties has largely been limited to working 
papers provided to Review Conferences.  It is recommended at the Sixth Review Conference 
that the States Parties should include as a topic for a future annual Meeting of States Parties 
prepared for by a Meeting of Experts the topic: 
 
To develop a procedure to facilitate international cooperation between States Parties 
and as part thereof to develop and adopt a Confidence-Building Measure to enhance 
transparency of cooperation between States Parties under Article X. 
 
The proposed development of a CBM to provide transparency of Article X cooperation 
would help to focus attention on the actual situation rather than the rhetoric so often 
expressed in this area.  Information on actual cooperation under Article X would make it 
easier for States Parties to recognise what cooperation is already taking place – and, through 
transparency, to be aware of what is achievable bringing benefits to all States Parties. 
 
Institutional Support 
 
66.  The States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference should consider agreeing to the setting 
up of a small interim institutional support to facilitate the annual meetings held during 2007 
to 2011 between the Sixth and the Seventh Review Conferences and also to help States 
Parties with implementation.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
67.  This Review Conference Paper has looked ahead to the Sixth Review Conference in the 
light of the developments relevant to the Convention around the world both nationally and 
internationally. As we approach the Sixth Review Conference there are widespread 
expectations both politically and publicly that the States Parties will demonstrate their 
accountability and commitment to the obligations that they have undertaken in becoming 
States Parties to the Convention.  There is also a widespread anticipation that the States 
Parties will act responsibly by adopting a constructive approach to achieving a successful 
outcome to the Sixth Review Conference and thereby demonstrating in concrete terms the 
real value to international peace and security made by the Convention. 
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68.  Consideration is first given to the Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2006 and then 
to Review Conference in November/December 2006.  A number of successful outcomes are 
identified and it is recommended that the States Parties adopt a modular approach obtaining 
agreement where consensus is achievable.   States Parties are urged to start considering such 
successful outcomes now and to drafting language that they can submit to the Committee of 
the Whole in regard to the relevant Articles of the Convention.  In addition, States Parties 
with a particular interest in one or more of the successful outcomes are encouraged to prepare 
and submit Working Papers to the Review Conference.  As noted in the introduction, success 
is rarely accidental and needs to be planned for. 
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